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STECAbstract In July–August 2009, eight patients with bloody diarrhea complicated by
hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) were admitted to hospitals in Tbilisi, Georgia. We
started active surveillance in two regions for bloody diarrhea and post-diarrheal
HUS. Of 25 case-patients who developed HUS, including the initial 8 cases, half were
P15 years old, 67% were female and seven (28%) died. No common exposures were
identified. Among 20 HUS case-patients tested, Shiga toxin was detected in the
stools of 2 patients (one with elevated serum IgG titers to several Escherichia coli
serogroups, including O111 and O104). Among 56 persons with only bloody diarrhea,
we isolated Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) O104:H4 from 2 and Shigella from
10; 2 had serologic evidence of E. coli O26 infection. These cases may indicate a
250 O. Chokoshvili et al.previously unrecognized burden of HUS in Georgia. We recommend national report-
ing of HUS and improving STEC detection capacity.
ª 2014 Ministry of Health, Saudi Arabia. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) can
cause illness ranging from mild diarrhea, to bloody
diarrhea, to the hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS)
– a life-threatening condition that manifests with a
triad of: microangiopathic hemolytic anemia,
thrombocytopenia, and acute renal failure [1].
HUS develops in approximately 6% of patients with
STEC O157:H7 infection [2], but other non-O157
STEC strains have been implicated, particularly in
the European region [3–7]. STEC are found in the
intestinal tracts and excrement of a variety of ani-
mals, especially ruminants. Outbreaks of STEC
infection are frequently associated with meat
products, such as ground beef, as well as raw
produce, dairy products, contaminated water, or
contact with ruminant mammals or ill persons [8].
The national communicable disease surveillance
system of Georgia monitors diarrheal diseases.
National regulation mandates notification of diar-
rhea cases within 24 h after registration. More than
three epidemiologically-linked cases trigger an
investigation [9]. Lack of laboratory capacity,
especially in rural areas, limits detection of enteric
pathogens in patients with diarrheal illness. STEC
infection complicated with HUS has never been
officially reported in Georgia.
Between July and August 2009, eight patients with
bloody diarrhea complicated by HUS were admitted
to hospitals in Tbilisi, Georgia; two of those patients
died. Stool samples of all patients were sent to the
laboratory of the National Center for Disease Control
and Public Health of Georgia (NCDC). After conduct-
ing bacterial culturing and serological testing, the
laboratory of the NCDC reported seven possible
E. coli O157 isolates from the eight hospitalized
patients. An investigation was initiated to determine
if these cases represented an outbreak, to identify
the etiologic agent(s) and, if possible, to identify
the source(s) of infections.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Active surveillance
On24 July 2009, active surveillance, casefinding and
data collection for bloody diarrhea and HUS wasinitiated at nine clinics in the two most affected
regions: Tbilisi (5 clinics) and Shida Kartli (4 clinics).
Most affected regions were identified based on anal-
ysis of line listing data and communication with the
main regional clinics of Georgia. All nine clinicswere
located in hospitals with the capacity for dialysis or
treatment of patients with diarrhea and that are
major regional or central level clinics. Active sur-
veillance efforts ceased on December 11, 2009.
Patients were identified based on clearly defined
case definitions: a case of bloody diarrhea was
defined as P3 patients reported loose stools in
24 h containing visible blood. A case of HUS was
defined as laboratory-confirmed anemia and kidney
damage (elevated creatinine, hematuria, or pro-
teinuria) occurring within 21 days after diarrheal
illness [10].
Each of the nine selected surveillance clinics
were provided with stool and serum collection kits
and detailed instructions for specimen collection
and storage. HUS and bloody diarrhea clinical
description and patient management information
were provided to physicians and supervisors of
infectious disease and/or dialysis departments. At
all nine clinics, a focal point was nominated for
daily phone calls. These calls were for identifica-
tion and reporting of any new cases of bloody diar-
rhea or HUS based on case definitions.
Stool samples were transported in sterile con-
tainers containing buffered glycerol saline solution
for better preservation during transport. A portion
of the stool sample was also inoculated into Buf-
fered Peptone Broth (0.2% final concentration) for
selective enrichment of E. coli and Salmonella
spp. Samples (stool and stool inoculated in broth)
were stored at 2–8 Celsius (C) and picked up from
collection sites in coolers containing cold packs.
Samples were delivered to NCDC for testing on
the same day from Tbilisi hospitals and within a
maximum of 48 h from regional hospitals.
2.2. Epidemiologic and clinical data
collection
Case-patients or their caregivers were interviewed
and demographic, clinical, and exposure informa-
tion was collected using structured questionnaires.
Exposures assessed included food, water sources,
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been exposed to within the 10 days before diarrhea
onset. Most interviews were done in person at hos-
pitals or during home visits. Additionally, field
investigations were conducted in two villages:
Dvani, located in the region of Kareli, and Mejvrisk-
evi, located in the region of Gori. Both villages
were located in the most affected area of the Shida
Kartli region, in the mid-eastern part of the coun-
try, approximately 150 km from the capital, Tbilisi.
During these field visits, case-patients were inter-
viewed with the structured questionnaires and also
non-structured, open-ended, hypothesis-generat-
ing conversations were initiated. To collect addi-
tional symptoms, laboratory, and treatment
information on all patients, medical charts were
made available by using an abstraction form devel-
oped for this investigation. Epi_Info v 3.5 was used
for data entry, collection and analysis.
2.3. Microbiological, molecular and
serological testing
After the first registered cases of HUS inGeorgia, the
necessary bacteriological, serological, and molecu-
lar diagnostic reagents and appropriate training
were kindly provided by colleagues from the United
States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), Atlanta, Georgia, to the laboratories at the
NCDC. The following methods were used to identify
enteric pathogens in stool samples: (1) isolation of
enteric pathogens (including Salmonella, Shigella,
E. coli) on selective and differential media (Soy
broth, Sorbitol broth, Endo agar, Hektoen enteric
agar, Kligler agar, SS agar, Sorbitol MacConkey agar,
CHROMagar O157); (2) identification of suspect iso-
lates by biochemical assays using theAPI-20E Enteric
Identification System (BioMerieux, Inc., Hazelwood,
MO), and serotyping by agglutination assays, includ-
ing those for E. coli sero-groups O157, O26, O45, and
O111; 3) detection of fecal Shiga toxin using a com-
mercial EIA (Premier EHEC, Meridian Bioscience Eur-
ope, Italy); and (4) determination of the presence of
Shiga toxin genes (stx1 and stx2), as well as the inti-
min (eae), and enterohemolysin (ehxA-also referred
to in the literature as hlyA and E-hly) genes in E. coli
bacterial growths/cultures and stool samples in
enrichment broths using conventional multiplex
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) conditions as
described [11]. Aliquots of serum, stool specimens,
and stool broth enrichments from 20 patients were
sent to the CDC-Atlanta for additional testing,
including primary isolation, O:H serotyping in a
microtiter format essentially as described by Ewing
[12], pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) [13],
antimicrobial susceptibility testing [14], andPCR-based detection of STEC [15,16] and enteroag-
gregative E. coli (EAEC) [17,18] virulence factors.
For the EAEC PCR, the primers for aggR and aatA
(aggR gene is a virulence regulator in EAEC, and aatA
is a plasmid encoded gene [pCVD432] and an EAEC
virulence factor) were combined, and the PCR was
performed as described by Schmidt et al. [17].
Unpaired serum specimens collected from patients
with HUS were tested for antibodies to several
E. coli lipopolysaccharide antigens (O157, O111,
O26, O104) using in-house developed assays (CDC-
Atlanta) [19].
2.4. Retrospective assessment of HUS cases
and dialysis utilization
To better assess if the number of HUS cases
observed represented a true increase over base-
line, hospital medical records were reviewed and
physicians from the department of kidney diseases
at the ‘‘A. Tsulukidze-National Center of Urology’’
and from the department of kidney diseases in
‘‘M. Iashvili-Children Central Hospital’’ were inter-
viewed to find other diagnosed HUS cases or similar
conditions meeting this HUS case definition during
the last three years. Cases were identified by phy-
sician recall and by a review of acute dialysis cases
in the dialysis registry. Because of administrative
issues at some clinics, access to review the medical
charts was not allowed for all surveillance sites.
3. Results
87 total bloody diarrhea cases were identified with
registration dates between June 1 and December
11, 2009; 62 patients had uncomplicated bloody
diarrhea and another 25 also developed HUS. Sam-
ples were collected for 76 patients; 56 with bloody
diarrhea only and 20 HUS cases. Most HUS and bloody
diarrhea cases occurred in the warmer months.
3.1. Uncomplicated bloody diarrhea
In 62 patients with uncomplicated bloody diarrhea,
the most common symptoms were abdominal pain
(32%) and vomiting (32%). The most affected age
groups were children <5 (7 persons) and the P15-
year olds (28 persons). However, age was unknown
for 26 patients (Table 1). Registered patients
resided in 10 out of the 12 regions of Georgia. No
deaths were recorded among these 62 patients.
3.2. Hemolytic uremic syndrome
Of the 25 patients who developed HUS, 68% were
female and 52% were P15 years of age (Table 1).
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of patients with bloody diarrhea and HUS (N = 87).
Characteristics Case-patients without HUS
(N = 62)
Case-patients with HUS
(N = 25)
n (%) n (%)
Age (years)
<5 7 11 4 16
5–14 1 2 8 32
15+ 28 45 13 52
Unknown 26 42
Sex
Male 27 44 8 32
Female 31 50 17 68
Unknown 4 6
Place of residence
Rural Dvani 1 8 3 13
Rural Mejvriskevi 0 0 1 4
Other rural villages 4 31 12 52
Urban 8 62 7 30
252 O. Chokoshvili et al.All HUS case-patients required dialysis. Seven (28%)
patients died, including 2 children <5 years of age
and 5 adults P15 years old. HUS case-patients
resided in 8 regions of Georgia; however, incidence
rates were highest in regions neighboring Tbilisi
(Fig. 2). Among all 25 cases, the first HUS case
was registered on July 10, 2009, and the last case
on October 12, 2009. The distribution includes
two waves of HUS cases with the second wave
beginning around September 10 (Fig. 1). Sixty-nine
percent of HUS case-patients resided in rural areas
(Table 1). Three HUS case-patients resided within
100 meters of each other in one village. In this
village, it was also found that three dogs withFig. 1 Distribution of HUS and bloody diarrhea cases by dat
the republic of Georgia, 2009.gastrointestinal symptoms had died around the
same time that the patients with HUS had first
become ill.3.3. Exposures
Thirteen (21%) of 62 patients with uncomplicated
bloody diarrhea and 19 (76%) of 25 patients with
HUS were able to be interviewed about exposures
to foods, water sources, animals, and ill persons.
Food and other exposure-specific attack rates and
attack rate ratios (RR) (Table 2) were calculated.
For HUS case patients, it was found that the highest
RR was associated with the consumption of icee of admission to the hospital, during outbreak of HUS in
Table 2 Distribution of potential risk factors among interviewed (N = 32) patients with bloody diarrhea (N = 13) and those
with HUS (N = 19).
Food products used or
other exposition
Exposed Unexposed Attack rate
ratio RRHUS Bloody
diarrhea
N Attack
rate %
HUS Bloody
diarrhea
N Attack
rate %
Cheese 5 8 13 38 14 5 19 74 0.5
Fresh tomato 6 6 12 50 13 7 20 65 0.8
Sausage 6 5 11 55 13 8 21 62 0.9
Apple 3 7 10 30 16 6 22 73 0.4
Ice cream 6 2 8 75 13 11 24 54 1.4*
Grapes 3 3 6 50 16 10 26 62 0.8
Dairy (excluding cheese
and ice cream)
1 5 6 17 18 8 26 69 0.2
Beef 1 4 5 20 18 9 27 67 0.3
Chicken 0 4 4 0 19 9 28 68 0.0
Fresh greens 1 3 4 25 18 10 28 64 0.4
Contact with domestic or
farm animals
during 10 days before onset
14 5 19 74 5 8 13 38 1.9*
Ate food outside home
during10 days
before onset
13 6 19 68 6 7 13 46 1.5*
Contact with ill patient who
had diarrhea
0 5 5 0 19 8 27 70 0.0
* Attack rate is more than 1.
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animals during the 10 days before the onset
(RR = 1.9), and eating food outside the home during
the 10 days before the onset (RR = 1.5).Fig. 2 Geographic distribution of HUS rData on antibiotic treatment after admission to
the hospital were available for 35 patients, among
which 13 (37%) had uncomplicated bloody diarrhea
and 22 (63%) had HUS. Ten patients (77%) withates in the republic of Georgia, 2009.
254 O. Chokoshvili et al.uncomplicated bloody diarrhea and 20 (90%) with
HUS had been treated with antibiotics by a physi-
cian either before or after hospital admission.
Thirty-six patients reported self-antibiotic
treatment prior to admission to the hospital; 14
(39%) presented with uncomplicated bloody diar-
rhea and 22 (61%) with HUS. Six of the 7 (86%)
patients who have died, were treated with
antibiotics by physicians and 1 had also self-treated
with antibiotics. It was unable to be establishedTable 3 Summary of laboratory results for 37 patients with b
ID Status Testing of fresh stool or stool
enrichment broths
Pathog
Shiga toxin
ELISA
Virulence genes
1 HUS + E. coli
2 HUS –
3 HUS   –
4 HUS   –
5 HUS + –
6 HUS  –
7 HUS –
8 BD E. coli
9 BD   E. coli
10 BD E. coli
11 BD   E. coli
12 BD   E. coli
13 BD   E. coli
14 BD   E. coli
15 BD  –
16 BD   –
17 BD   –
18 BD   –
19 BD   –
20 BD   –
21 BD  –
22 BD stx2a, aatA E. coli
23 BD eae, stx2 E. coli
24 BD  –
25 BD  –
26 BD  stx2a, aatA, eae^ E. coli
27 BD –
28 BD  –
29 BD  S. boyd
30 BD  S. boyd
31 BD  S. boyd
32 BD  S. flex
33 BD S. sonn
34 BD S. sonn
35 BD S. sonn
36 BD S. sonn
37 BD S. sonn
+ Isolate was not serogrouped.
# stx2a-positive, eae-negative, ehxA-negative, aatA-positive (CDC
^ eae, stx2 positive (NCDC).what types of antibiotics were taken, what the
usage interval was or what dosage was taken by
the patients prior to hospitalization.
3.4. Retrospective review of HUS cases
Review of the medical records at the ‘‘M.
Iashvili-Children Central Hospital’’ revealed 2 HUS
cases in 2008 and 9 in 2009. One case of HUS
was registered at the ‘‘A. Tsulukidze-Urologyloody diarrhea (BD) or HUS.
enic stool isolates Serum ELISA titers
O111 O104-IgG 1280
O111, O26, O45-IgG 640
–
–
–
O111
O111
O111
O26
O26
O26, S. dysenteriae type 3
O45
–
–
–
–
O104:H4#
+,^
O104:H4# –
O26-IgG 1280
ii
ii
ii
neri O26-IgM, IgG 640
ei
ei
ei
ei
ei
Atlanta).
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in 2009.Fig. 3 Conventional multiplex PCR of E. coli isolates
and stool enrichment broth from patients with bloody
diarrhea. This is located under Fig. 3 as legend. 100 bp
Molecular marker ladders are located on the outer and
central lanes (1, 10, 19, 20, 29, and 37) of each gel. Lane
35 contains a negative control; lane 36 contains E. coli
O157 positive control and indicates location of the ehxA
(534 bp), eae (384 bp), stx2 (255 bp), and stx1 (180 bp)
genes. Lanes 7 (eae positive) and 8 (stx2 positive) are
from stool isolates; lane 21 (eae positive) is from a stool
enrichment broth.3.5. Laboratory findings
The laboratory of NCDC tested a total of 76 fecal
specimens from patients with bloody diarrhea
cases; 20 of these specimens were from those with
HUS. A total of 66 samples from 20 patients (12
with bloody diarrhea and 8 HUS patients) were also
sent to the CDC (Atlanta, Georgia) for further test-
ing. Combined laboratory results from tests done
both at the NCDC and the CDC are summarized in
Table 3.
Examination of clinical samples from patients
with HUS (Table 3) revealed the following results:
• Preliminary results presumptive for E. coli O157
obtained, at the beginning of the study, at the NCDC
laboratory based on bacterial culture and serotyping
with available diagnostic sera were not corroborated
by CDC-Atlanta.
• Shiga toxin was demonstrated by EIA from the stool of
a patient who died with HUS. In addition, the patient
had elevated antibody titers to E. coli O104, O26, and
O111.
• One patient with negative bacteriology results had
Shiga toxin detected by EIA from stool.
• Shigella species were not isolated from persons with
HUS.
Among those with uncomplicated bloody diar-
rhea, the following results were obtained:
• 10 persons had Shigella species isolated from their
stools; S. boydii (3 patients), S. sonnei (5 patients),
S. dysenteriae type 3 (1 patient), and S. flexneri (1
patient). The serum specimen from the patient with
S. flexneri was also positive for E. coli O26 antibodies
(Table 3).
• 18 persons had various E. coli stool isolates; 3 were
sero-grouped as O111, 3 as O26 (1 had S. dysenteriae
type 3 in his stool), 2 as O104:H4, and 1 as O45
(Table 3).
• One person did not have any E. coli isolates, but was
positive for antibodies to E. coli sero-group O26.
• Samples from 2 patients were positive for the eae
(intimin) gene (Fig. 3 gel lanes 7 and 21) by conven-
tional multiplex PCR initially performed at NCDC on
stool enrichment broths. A second specimen from
one of these patients (Table 3 patient #23) was also
positive for stx2 (gel lane 8). Virulence genes were
not initially demonstrated at NCDC for patient 26,
but were positive at CDC-Atlanta (Table 3).
• Only 2 E. coli O104:H4 isolates (patients 22 and 26)
were eventually confirmed to carry Shiga toxin (stx2a)
genes (CDC-Atlanta). The virulence gene and antimi-
crobial resistance profiles of these two O104:H4 iso-
lates, as well as other E. coli strains are summarizedin Table 4. Like the strains that caused the severe
outbreak of bloody diarrhea in Germany in 2011, both
strains from Georgia were stx2a-positive, eae-nega-
tive, ehxA-negative, aggR-positive and aatA-positive.
Both O104 isolates were resistant to ampicillin,
streptomycin, sulfisoxazole, and trimethoprim/sulfa-
methoxazole. One was also resistant to tetracycline.
In contrast to the strains from Germany, both strains
from Georgia were susceptible to third-generation
cephalosporins [14].
• PFGE analysis of the strains listed in Table 4 showed
that the two STEC O104:H4 isolates from Georgia clus-
tered with the two isolates from the 2011 outbreak in
Germany and were clearly separable from an EAEC
O104:H4 control strain from the Central African
Republic and the STEC O104:H21 strain from Montana,
USA.
4. Discussion
Georgia experienced many HUS and bloody diar-
rhea cases during the period July–December 2009
in most of its regions. Because of the wide geo-
graphical distribution of patients, no reported
exposures to widely distributed foods or other
products, and a considerable diversity in the types
of pathogens detected, it was considered that most
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256 O. Chokoshvili et al.of the cases represented a previously undetected
burden of sporadic HUS and bloody diarrhea or sev-
eral small unrelated outbreaks, or both. However,
based on this assessment of past dialysis usage,
more HUS cases appear to have occurred in 2009
relative to preceding years. Although this increase
could be an artifact of enhanced surveillance, it
does suggest that, for unknown reasons, the inci-
dence of HUS did increase in 2009. In the years
since, a higher incidence of toxigenic E. coli cases
has also been reported by the NCDC (unpublished
data).
This study demonstrated that laboratory speci-
mens from a few cases were positive for patho-
genic organisms, including enteroaggregative
Shiga toxin-positive E. coli O104:H4 and the Shi-
gella species. Additional microbiological and sero-
logical evidence show that E. coli with the same
or serologically related O antigens as STEC O26,
STEC O45 and STEC O111, were circulating among
those with bloody diarrhea at or before the time
of this investigation. The isolation of Shigella spe-
cies in 10 (34%) of the 29 patients with bloody diar-
rhea from whom the specimens were collected
shows the high incidence of these infections in
those patients at the time. No Shigella dysenteriae
type 1 – a pathogen that also produces Shiga toxin
and causes HUS – was identified. This organism,
however, is fragile and may not survive long in clin-
ical specimens [31].
Even though the purpose of this surveillance was
to identify infections capable of causing HUS, a rel-
atively broad case definition was chosen which
included any bloody diarrhea illness. As expected,
the selection of this sensitive case definition cap-
tured a large group of illnesses, including STEC
infections, other infections such as shigellosis,
and many illnesses with no etiology determined.
Although this limited the specificity of these sur-
veillance efforts to target HUS-causing organisms,
this choice of case definition was necessary given
the very limited number of diarrheal illnesses in
Georgia in which an etiology is determined. HUS
affected a significantly larger proportion of
females than males; this phenomenon is similar
to the epidemiological picture of the enteroaggre-
gative STEC O104:H4 outbreak in Germany in 2011
and also has been observed for STEC O157 in the
United States [2,20]. The patient profile in the
Georgian cases may be related to close contact,
eating, and living behaviors between adult women
and their children <15 years old.
The case fatality rate of 28% among HUS patients
is high compared with reports in the literature
[1,2,20]. Several possible explanations for the
Fig. 4 Macrorestriction analysis (BlnI and XbaI) by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis of Escherichia coli O104 isolates
described in Table 4. This is located under Fig. 4 as legend. Dendrogram is based on combined PFGE patterns and was
generated by BioNumerics 5.2 (Applied Maths, Inc., Austin, Texas, USA). Similarity analysis was performed using the
Dice coefficient and clustering was performed using the unweighted pair-group method with arithmetic averages
(UPGMA).
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of the causative agent(s) or host-pathogen interac-
tions [21]; (2) disease transmission factors that
relate to the dose of pathogens ingested; (3) lack
of financial means and awareness on the part of
patients about the importance of early referral to
hospital at the time of bloody diarrhea; (4) limited
familiarity of physicians in Georgia with HUS clini-
cal management or disease epidemiology; and (5)
delays in accessing appropriate levels of care,
especially in rural areas. Georgia has dialysis
capacities only in the urban centers, which means
that patients must be referred to and transported
to these units even though they may be located
far from their locations of residence.
Because HUS is not a reportable condition and
was rarely registered previously in Georgia, physi-
cians are not aware of adequate diagnostic proce-
dures and clinical case management. The fact
that many patients were initially treated with anti-
biotics by physicians even though they presented
with classical HUS manifestations is of concern
and attests to the lack of general knowledge that
treatment of bloody diarrhea with antibiotics may
precipitate HUS if STEC has not been ruled out as
a cause [22,23]. An informal interview of physi-
cians suggested a lack of knowledge about HUS
diagnosis and clinical management. Nonetheless,
some physicians working at the A. Tsulukidze-
National Center of Urology and Infectious Diseases,
AIDS and Clinical Immunology Research Center
recalled cases of HUS during the past several years
and were aware of the clinical condition. At
present, no national clinical guidelines for antibiot-
ics use in the treatment of bloody diarrhea
exists even though antibiotics have wide availabil-
ity and usage in Georgia. Early administration of
intravenous fluids may reduce complications and
death of patients with STEC infections capable of
causing HUS [24].Although a search into the possible sources of
infections is warranted in the context of a possible
outbreak of STEC infections, this study was unable
to identify a single unifying exposure among case-
patients. The following individual risk factors for
developing HUS were identified: eating food out-
side the home during the 10 days before the onset
of symptoms, contact with domestic animals, and
eating ice cream. Nevertheless, this study did
demonstrate that robust surveillance and timely
laboratory diagnostics could enable the early
detection of localized clusters of illness and possi-
bly allow interventions to limit the extent and
severity of the clinical illness. Through this surveil-
lance, rapid identification of a cluster of 3 HUS
cases in a small rural village in the Shida Kartli
region was possible. There is much uncertainty as
to what role, if any, the ill dogs played in dis-
ease transmission in this village. Dogs infected
with STEC can develop HUS [25]; however, no lab-
oratory isolation attempt was made from animal
specimens.
Until the very large outbreak of STEC O104:H4 in
Germany in 2011 and a smaller outbreak among
travelers returning from Turkey, this STEC serotype
was rarely described. The virulence gene profiles of
both STEC O104:H4 isolates matched those of the
German outbreak strain (stx2a-positive, eae-nega-
tive hly-negative, aaT-positive, and aggR-positive)
[14,21]. The Georgian isolates, however, show 1–
2 band difference from the German outbreak
strains by xbaI and blnI restriction enzyme analysis
using the PulseNet non-O157 protocol [13,26]. In
addition, both the Georgian and German strains
had similar antimicrobial susceptibility patterns
except the German strain showed resistance to cef-
triaxone [21,27].
No etiology was determined for most illnesses.
This could be due in part to the high frequency
of patients treated with antibiotics either as
258 O. Chokoshvili et al.prescribed by a physician or through self-treatment
and due to the general difficulty in isolating STEC
organisms. Due to a variety of reasons, including
costs of seeking medical help and perhaps the dis-
tances between rural communities and medical
centers, many Georgians regularly self-treat with
available antibiotics.
This investigation had several limitations that
likely further limited the ability to determine the
etiology of illnesses. First, the investigation was
initiated at the end of July, whereas cases of
bloody diarrhea began in June. Access to labora-
tory supplies and training of staff were not appro-
priate at the initial stages of the investigation,
and the sample collection network only became
operational in the middle of August. Secondly,
there was a general lack of experience in labora-
tory detection of STEC [28] and understanding the
importance of collecting stool samples early after
the onset of diarrhea. In many instances, stool
samples were collected more than several days
after the onset of diarrhea. Also, it was not possi-
ble to determine the types, dosage and the dura-
tion of use of antibiotics that may have been
taken by patients prior to hospitalization. HUS typ-
ically develops in approximately 5–7 days after the
onset of diarrhea and by that time, the amount of
STEC in the stool is often very limited and diarrhea
has often ceased [29]. Thirdly, at the time of the
HUS reports in 2009, neither specialty hospitals
nor NCDC laboratories had sufficient capacity and
funding to fully detect, isolate, identify, and sub-
type STEC. Fourthly, suboptimal specimen storage
and transportation may have further limited identi-
fication of the pathogens. Review of the literature
showed that there is a lack of information on the
epidemiology of bloody diarrhea and HUS caused
by STEC in the region, including Georgia [30] and
the Newly Independent States (NIS).
Several recommendations can be made based on
these findings to better understand the epidemiol-
ogy of these infections in this region of the world.
First, in order to ensure early detection of out-
breaks and to better describe the epidemiology of
diarrheal diseases and HUS in Georgia, it should
be mandatory to report HUS and bloody diarrhea
cases nationally. Secondly, training of physicians
is needed to increase awareness of the clinical pre-
sentations, diagnosis and treatment of HUS, includ-
ing the importance of reporting every HUS case.
Thirdly, the fact that a strain of STEC O104:H4
nearly identical to that responsible for the deadly
outbreak in Europe in 2011 was isolated highlights
the need to collaborate across borders to improve
investigation and control efforts.In the course of this investigation, proper collec-
tion, storage and transportation of samples were
identified as a weakness that needs to be addressed
in Georgia. These elements are part of the basic
prerequisite for surveillance and outbreak investi-
gation. Furthermore, there must be adequate
capacity in terms of reference laboratory infra-
structure and expertise for testing collected stool
samples during these outbreaks. Finally, it is
recommended that the feasibility of laboratories,
particularly those in referral hospitals and in the
rural regions, or in regional public health centers,
to implement testing for the timely identification
of STEC or Shiga toxin in clinical specimens be
evaluated.
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